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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Evidence to the Contrary: Extreme Weekly Returns Are Underreactions. (August 2004) 
Eric Kyle Kelley, B.B.A., West Texas A&M University; 
M.S., Texas Tech University 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Roberto C. Gutierrez, Jr. 
                                             Dr. L. Paige Fields 
 
 
The finding of reversals in weekly returns has been attributed to a combination of 
microstructure issues and overreaction to information.  I provide new evidence 
eliminating overreaction as a source of reversal.  I show that well-known weekly 
contrarian profits are followed by a long run of momentum profits.  In fact, these profits 
are strong enough to produce a significant momentum effect over the full year following 
portfolio formation.  Thus, the market does not appear to view extreme weekly returns as 
excessive, as implied by an overreaction story.  To the contrary, this return continuation 
is consistent with underreaction to the news driving extreme weekly returns.  This is 
supported by cross-sectional tests in which I find this week’s news is positively related 
to next week’s returns.  The evidence presented here is consistent with growing evidence 
that underreaction to firm-specific information is a pervasive feature of price formation.  
Therefore, if any short-run contrarian profits can be realized, they are better viewed as 
compensation for providing liquidity than as a reward for arbitrage. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Short-run individual stock returns reverse immediately.  Lehmann (1990) finds 
that contrarian strategies which buy stocks with low weekly returns and sell stocks with 
high weekly returns generate positive profits over the following week.  Jegadeesh (1990) 
shows that a one-month contrarian strategy is also profitable.  This reversal pattern has 
spawned much discussion over the past decade.  Is it due to time variation in risk premia? 
Is it due to market inefficiencies?  Is it spurious? Lehmann highlights that return 
predictability over such a short horizon cannot plausibly be attributed to time variation in 
risk premia.1  That leaves the debate to focus on spuriousness or market inefficiencies as 
the sources of short-horizon predictability. 
 Bid-ask bounce and nonsynchronous trading are sources of spurious reversals in 
returns.  Kaul and Nimalendran (1990) and Conrad, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991) show 
that part of return reversal is due to bid-ask bounce.  Lo and MacKinlay (1990) and 
Boudoukh, Richardson, and Whitelaw (1994) note that nonsynchronous trading 
contributes to contrarian profits.2  Lead-lag effects and market-maker inventory control 
are forms of market inefficiencies that can lead to return reversal, but these are not 
inefficiencies due to cognitive biases.  Lo and MacKinlay (1990) provide evidence that 
that lead-lag effects explain more than half of the contrarian profits of their strategy.  
This could reflect delayed reactions of some stocks to a common factor.  Jegadeesh and 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Finance. 
1 Conrad and Kaul (1988) identify a positively autocorrelated stationary process in short-run expected 
returns, which they interpret as a time-varying risk premium.   
2 These studies take different views on the severity of the problem.  Lo and MacKinlay argue the effect of 
nonsychronous trading is trivial, while Boudoukh, Richardson, and Whitleaw believe it is much stronger. 
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Titman (1995b) observe that market-makers set prices in part to control their inventory, 
which also induces a return reversal.3  Empirical researchers, however, have had great 
difficulty in establishing the above sources as the sole drivers of weekly reversals. 
Controlling for these sources of reversals in various ways, Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1995a), Cooper (1999), and Subrahmanyam (2003) conclude that contrarian profits are 
largely due to overreactions to firm-specific news. 
 With this short-run debate ensuing, other researchers have independently 
documented persistence in returns after many corporate events, such as unexpected 
earnings, dividend changes, stock repurchases, stock splits, and seasoned equity 
offerings, as well as after headline news and cash-flow news.4  Short-run reversals and 
the conclusion that the market is overreacting are curious in light of the evidence of such 
perceived underreaction to firm-specific news.  In this dissertation, I attempt to reconcile 
this conflict. 
The duration of the return reversal found by Lehmann (1990) and Jegadeesh 
(1990) is less than four weeks, while the continuations following firm-specific news last 
up to a year.  Therefore, I begin my analysis by extending the holding period of 
portfolios similar to those used in the short-run literature.  Suppose the weekly return 
reversal is due solely to microstructure issues and not in any way to an intrinsic 
overreaction to firm-specific news.  Suppose also that, as the news literature suggests, 
                                                 
3 Amihud and Mendelson (1980) and Ho and Stoll (1983) model the effects inventory has on the market-
maker’s quoted prices. Madhavan and Smidt (1993) and Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) find that changes 
in dealer inventory are negatively related to changes in prices.  
4 See the appendix of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) for a list of the studies that find post-
event continuation in returns.  Chan (2003) examines headline news and Vuolteenaho (2002) decomposes 
annual returns into news about cash flows and news about discount rates.  
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there generally is an underreaction to firm-specific news.  Since the microstructure 
effects should dissipate in a few weeks, we should expect to see a continuation in returns 
once the microstructure issues fade if the market is actually underreacting to news in the 
formation week.  
Consistent with prior studies, I find that a strategy that buys weekly extreme 
winners and sells weekly extreme losers generates negative profits in the first four weeks 
of the holding period (one can simply reverse the sign to get contrarian profits).  The 
profits to these weekly portfolios behave quite differently, however, after four weeks.  
My key finding is that extreme weekly returns in fact persist for roughly a year once the 
brief return reversal dissipates.  This continuation in returns is robust and steady across 
the subsequent weeks.  Moreover, the continuation easily offsets the brief reversal that 
follows portfolio formation.   In other words, the fifty-two-week post-formation period 
displays no evidence of a correction.  In sum, my findings are inconsistent with an 
overreaction to news occurring in the formation period. 
 Additionally, I not only find that the subsequent continuation in returns offsets 
the initial reversal; I find that the continuation dominates.  Across the fifty-two weeks 
following portfolio formation, the winners continue to outperform the losers.  So I find 
evidence of underreaction.  This finding is consistent with the evidence of continuation 
in returns following firm-specific news, mentioned above.  This consistency is 
remarkable given that the extant literature paints a complexity of reversal and 
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momentum patterns, with reversal in the short-run, momentum in the intermediate-run, 
and reversal again in the long-run.5 
This new evidence provides some consistency across the short-run predictability 
and post-event drift literatures.  However, it is still interesting that the event literature 
rarely documents any immediate reversal.  In fact, there is direct evidence of no 
significant reversal immediately following six of the eight events Daniel, Hirshleifer, 
and Subrahmanyam (1998) associate with post-event drift.  Appendix I provides a list of 
studies documenting such evidence.  In light of this, I consider a subset of the main 
strategy with earnings announcements during the formation week.  These stocks 
experience both an extreme return and a specific news announcement.  After controlling 
for bid-ask bounce, I find (i) no immediate reversal and (ii) strong return continuation 
for a full year.  Thus, it appears that in this subset strategy the strength of the news 
offsets any pressure to reverse even in week one. 
Pursuing this result further and in a more general context, I find that the initial 
reversal in returns is not attributable to abnormal firm-specific residual returns 
(standardized residuals), which I interpret as firm-specific news.  Instead, the reversals 
are strongly related to total returns, consistent with the reversals being due only to 
microstructure issues.  Holding last week’s returns constant, I find a positive relation 
between last week’s news (standardized residual) and this week’s return.  Hence, 
                                                 
5  The behavioral theories of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Barberis, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1998), and Hong and Stein (1999) each jointly explain return momentum at three- to twelve-
month horizons and return reversal at three- to five-year horizons, but fail to accommodate the short-run 
reversal at weekly horizons.  
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realizable profits to weekly contrarian strategies, if any, are better viewed as 
compensation for providing liquidity to the market, rather than as a reward for arbitrage. 
While some researchers have challenged the overreaction interpretation of 
weekly reversals, they have been unable to show that microstructure effects can fully 
explain contrarian profits.  Estimating the microstructure effects though is very difficult 
to do.  I contribute to the literature by, in a sense, stepping back and making an 
observation using a longer window.  This approach addresses the source of reversals 
without explicitly measuring various microstructure effects.  The performance of the 
extreme-weekly return stocks over a long window refutes the overreaction hypothesis. 
This dissertation also contributes to a growing body of research suggesting return 
persistence is a pervasive feature of the price formation process.  In concert with the 
momentum and post event drift literatures, Vuolteenaho (2002) and Chan (2003) provide 
general evidence of a delayed response to news identified over a monthly horizon.  
Gutierrez and Pirinsky (2004) show large news shocks measured over periods as short as 
a month and as long as three years is associated with drift that never reverses.  My 
findings round out this picture of return persistence.  Patterns of return predictability 
across time horizons and events are consistent with each other and perhaps much simpler 
than originally perceived.  The only effect of firm-specific news on future returns is that 
of continuation. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.  Section II contains a 
detailed literature review, primarily focusing on return-based predictability.  Section III 
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describes the data and portfolio construction.  Section IV presents empirical results and 
robustness tests.  Section V concludes. 
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A. Short-Run Reversals 
 Individual stock returns are predictable at weekly and monthly horizons.  The 
predictability manifests in positive profits to trading strategies that buy short-term (i.e., 
weekly or monthly) losers and sell short-term winners.  There is no current consensus on 
the source of the predictability or its implications for market efficiency.  Some argue 
these patterns are driven by numerous market microstructure issues such as bid-ask 
bounce, non-synchronous trading, and market maker inventory concerns.  After 
controlling for these issues in various ways, other researchers still find evidence of 
reversals and attribute the patterns to market overreaction.  This implies extreme weekly 
returns are excessive, and subsequent reversals represent corrections.  In this section, I 
describe the empirical facts regarding short-term predictability and summarize 
explanations provided by the literature. 
 
A.1.  Initial Findings 
Lehmann (1990) and Jegadeesh (1990) document short-run predictability in 
individual stock returns that is both statistically and economically significant.  Lehmann 
(1990) considers a contrarian strategy that exploits profitability at the weekly horizon.  
His strategy invests in all securities, where weights are determined by the previous 
week’s returns, and holds these positions for one week.  The weighting scheme gives 
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positive weights to the prior week’s losers and negative weights to the prior week’s 
winners.  In addition, securities with more extreme returns are given greater weight. 
Lehmann’s strategy generates average 1-week profits of 1.79% over the 1962-
1986 time period that do not dissipate over time.  The average positive profits persist 
even after transactions costs up to .30%.  Strategy profits are positive in over 90% of the 
individual weeks, 99% of non-overlapping 4-week investment periods, and 100% of all 
13-, 26-, and 52-week non-overlapping investment periods.  Lehmann views this as 
evidence of a measured arbitrage opportunity since an investor appears to have been able 
to consistently earn positive trading profits.  Finally, the profits to the trading strategy 
are short-lived.  When current weights are based on returns two weeks ago, profits 
disappear with moderate transactions costs. 
Jegadeesh (1990) uses cross-sectional regressions and finds that monthly returns 
are strongly negatively related to lagged monthly returns and positively related to 
monthly returns at longer lags.  To gauge the economic significance of this predictability, 
he considers trading strategies based his cross-sectional models.  Each month, he ranks 
firms into deciles by their out-of-sample return forecasts.  He then forms a strategy that 
buys an equal-weighted portfolio consisting of the top decile firms and sells an equal-
weighted portfolio of the bottom decile firms.  Finally, he holds the positions for one 
month and is left with a time series of monthly strategy profits. 
When only the first lag of monthly returns is used in the forecasting model, the 
strategy’s monthly raw (risk-adjusted) return is 2% (1.53%).  When returns from months 
-1 to -12, -24, and -36, are all used, the monthly raw (risk-adjusted) return increases to 
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2.5% (1.77%).  Clearly the majority of the strategy’s profits are attributable to 
information in the first lagged monthly return.  Since returns are negatively related to lag 
1 returns in the cross-sectional models, these strategies are buying securities that were 
losers over the previous month and selling securities that were winners over the previous 
month.  Thus, they are contrarian strategies. 
 
A.2. Market Microstructure 
 The well-known bid-ask bounce leads to spurious reversals.  Roll (1984) 
illustrates this with a simple model in which a bid-ask spread exists and the “true” stock 
price does not change over time.  In this situation, all return variation is caused by 
movements between the bid price and the ask price.  If the “true” price of the stock is the 
midpoint between the bid and ask prices and trades are equally likely to occur at the bid 
and the ask, spurious negative serial correlation will exist in observed returns.  This is 
especially problematic for an econometrician calculating profits for a trading strategy 
based on past returns.  The intuition is simple.  An econometrician who selects stocks 
with high returns is likely to select a disproportionately high number of stocks with final 
trades at the ask price, since the ask price is the high end of the spread.  Conversely, 
stocks with very low returns are more likely to have final trades at the bid price.6  Thus, 
the presence of the bid-ask bounce will induce reversals in observed (transaction) returns 
of past winner and loser portfolios.  Since these reversals are simply driven by 
                                                 
6 Ball, Kothari, and Wasley (1995) verify this notion using data from a sample of NASDAQ stocks from 
1983-1990. 
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movements between the bid and ask prices, they are not exploitable by a trader seeking 
arbitrage opportunities. 
A number of researchers highlight the role of bid-ask bounce by computing 
returns with bid prices or bid-ask midpoints.  Bid-to-bid or midpoint returns arguably 
better reflect true price changes.  Researchers contrast patterns found in these returns 
with those documented using transaction returns from CRSP.  The chief limitation to this 
approach is data availability.  When the literature developed, bid prices were only 
available for certain NASDAQ stocks.  Furthermore, this data series begins in 1983.  
Since these papers were published in the early 1990s, they use the already limited data 
set over a short sample period.  These points not withstanding, the evidence suggests 
bid-ask bounce may be largely driving the reversals. 
 Kaul and Nimalendran (1990) compare transactions returns with returns based on 
bid prices for NASDAQ stocks from 1983-1987.  If stock prices follow a random walk, 
return variance should increase linearly with the return measurement interval.  In other 
words, the variance of 2-day returns should be twice the variance of 1-day returns.  More 
generally, they write the variance ratio as: 
( )
( )
day t.at  interval period-k afor return R
day t,for return R
 where
,
Rvar
Rvar
k
1)k(VR
k
t
t
t
k
t
=
=
=
 
The random walk hypothesis predicts variance ratios to be 1 for all return horizons.  
Negative (positive) serial correlation will result in variance ratios less than (greater than) 
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1.  Kaul and Nimalendran calculate average variance ratios for each return series over 1- 
to 12-week horizons.  Consistent with the findings of Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann 
(1990), variance ratios are less than 1 for the transactions returns through the 4-week 
return interval.  However, variance ratios are close to 1 even at the 1-week horizon for 
the bid-to-bid returns.  Furthermore, they increase with the return interval.  This suggests 
there may actually be return continuation. 
Conrad, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991) also use NASDAQ returns from 1983-
1987.  They consider both time-variation in expected returns and bid-ask errors as 
drivers of time series variation in individual security returns.  As a proxy for expected 
return, they use an AR(1) out-of-sample forecast for the appropriate size-based portfolio.  
The bid-ask error is defined as the difference between the actual return and a return 
calculated with bid-ask midpoints.  Individual firm regressions of returns on expected 
returns and bid-ask errors reveal two key findings.  First, time-variation in expected 
returns and bid-ask errors can explain up to 24% of the variance of security returns.  
Second, there is little evidence of serial covariance in the regression error terms.  This 
suggests time-varying expected returns and bid-ask errors can explain most of the serial 
covariance in the security returns of the given sample. 
 Two other recent papers attempt to alleviate concern with results based solely on 
NASDAQ data.  Ball, Kothari, and Wasley (1995) note that bid-ask bounce predicts a 
positive relation between returns in weeks -1 and +1 relative to portfolio formation 
(Portfolios are defined using week 0 returns.), while overreaction predicts no relation.  
This relation is indeed significantly positive for NASDAQ transaction returns from 
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1983-1990, but it is insignificant for bid-to-bid returns.  This same relation is also 
significantly positive for NYSE and Amex returns from 1962-1988.  This indirect 
evidence suggests that the conclusions drawn from the short NASDAQ sample could 
possibly be generalized to all stocks.  Conrad, Gultekin, and Kaul (1997) use NASDAQ 
returns from 1985-1989 and NYSE and Amex returns from 1990-1991.  The Lehmann 
(1990) decomposition for bid-to-bid returns reveals no profits due to own serial 
covariance in the NASDAQ stocks and only small profits in the NYSE and Amex stocks.  
Further, transactions costs greater than .1% typically make the latter profits disappear.  It 
is also interesting to note that there is small, positive serial covariance in the bid-to-bid 
returns of the NASDAQ sample.  This is consistent with continuation – not reversals. 
Non-synchronous trading is a second microstructure issue that can induce 
contrarian profits.  Simply put, non-synchronous trading means all securities do not trade 
in a given interval.  The model of Lo and MacKinlay (1990a) illustrates how the returns 
of portfolios with higher non-trading probabilities lag those with lower non-trading 
probabilities.  Furthermore, Lo and MacKinlay (1990c) empirically decompose the 
profits of a strategy similar to Lehmann (1990) and find that over half of the profits are 
attributable to lead-lag effects.  This finding suggests non-synchronous trading warrants 
further examination as a driver of observed contrarian profits. 
Using the Lo and MacKinlay (1990a) model of non-trading, Lo and MacKinlay 
(1990c) show that the implied probabilities of non-trading are too high to fully explain 
contrarian profits driven by lead-lag relations.  Boudoukh, Richardson, and Whitelaw 
(1994), on the other hand, argue that Lo and MacKinlay (1990c) understate the impact of 
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non-synchronous trading.  Under more general conditions, such as heterogeneity in non-
trading probabilities and betas within a portfolio, non-synchronous trading can have a 
much greater affect on cross serial correlations than previously believed. 
A third microstructure issue involves the role of the market maker.  Lehmann 
(1990) conjectures that reversals reflect inefficiencies in the short-term market for 
liquidity.  Perhaps market makers act as intermediaries between patient and impatient 
traders by providing liquidity over very short time horizons.  The market maker induces 
reversals as compensation for providing this service.  This scenario represents a type of 
market inefficiency; however, it is not related to the market’s processing of information 
or cognitive biases of investors. 
Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993) provide a formal model of risk-averse 
agents acting as market makers for liquidity traders.  When liquidity traders sell, the 
market makers require compensation for offsetting their orders.  This compensation 
comes in the form of higher expected returns, thus leading to reversals.  Liquidity 
trading is characterized by elevated trading volume, thus reversals should be stronger for 
securities with abnormally high volume.  Conrad, Hameed, and Niden (1994) provide 
supporting evidence.  They form a weekly contrarian strategy using NASDAQ midpoint 
returns from 1983 to 1990.  Securities with increases in trading volume over the 
formation week exhibit reversals.  Interestingly, securities with decreases in trading 
volume actually display return continuation. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1995b) discuss the market maker’s inventory concerns 
and implications for return reversals.  As in the model of Ho and Stoll (1981), the market 
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maker adjusts quoted prices when inventories deviate from their desired levels.  For 
example, when inventory is too high – presumably from filling an imbalance of sell 
orders – the market maker drops quoted prices to induce buy orders.  Quotes will remain 
depressed until the inventory concerns are alleviated.  When the quotes return to 
“normal” levels, a reversal is observed.  Madhavan and Smidt (1993) and Hasbrouck and 
Sofianos (1993) provide evidence that specialists engage in this type of price setting 
behavior. 
 
A.3.  Overreaction 
The microstructure issues and related evidence discussed above have raised the 
bar for researchers that attribute contrarian profits to overreaction.  In addition, Lo and 
MacKinlay (1990c) show that less than half of the profits of their contrarian strategy are 
driven by serial covariances of individual stock returns (see their Appendix I for the 
decomposition).  They use this portion as an upper bound for the contribution of an 
overreaction component. 7  However, numerous researchers have acknowledged these 
issues in various ways and still find contrarian profits.  Their main interpretation is that 
the market overreacts in the short run.  This research is discussed below. 
 Since its inception, the short-run reversals literature has acknowledged biases 
associated with bid-ask bounce.  According to Roll’s simple model, the bid-ask bounce 
only induces spurious negative serial correlation in adjacent returns.  This suggests that 
                                                 
7 Lo and MacKinlay’s (1990) empirical methodology limits the sample to stocks with no missing weekly 
returns over from 1962-1987.  To alleviate some sample selection concerns, they repeat the analysis for 
securities with no missing observations over each half of the sample period and find similar results. 
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skipping a certain time period between the formation period and the holding period 
provides a control for bid-ask effects.8  Early work by Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann 
(1990) does this precisely.  Jegadeesh measures past monthly returns, excluding the final 
trading day of the month.  Lehmann does the same thing with weekly returns.  In both 
cases, trading strategy profits are diminished, but not eliminated.  Both authors argue 
that even after controlling for microstructure concerns about the bid-ask bounce, short-
run contrarian profits are statistically significant and economically meaningful.  
Jegadeesh’s monthly abnormal return falls from 1.53% to 1.08%, while Lehmann’s 
weekly raw return falls from 1.79% to 1.21%.  Jegadeesh clearly leaves the door open to 
an overreaction story.  As stated earlier, Lehmann conjectures the profits are due to 
inefficiencies in the market for liquidity around large price changes. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1995a) take a much stronger stance in favor of 
overreaction.  They show the decomposition from Lo and MacKinlay (1990c) is 
misleading with respect to overreaction because delayed reactions to common factors 
affect both own and cross serial covariances.  Thus, the average cross serial covariance 
does not accurately estimate the portion of contrarian profits due to lead-lag effects.  As 
an alternative, Jegadeesh and Titman use a factor model based decomposition.  Their 
decomposition separately measures contrarian profits due to over- or underreaction to 
common factors and firm-specific information.  In short, they find that prices react with 
a delay to common factors (resulting in a lead-lag effect), but overreact to firm-specific 
information.  The majority of contrarian profits are due to the latter.  Furthermore, they 
                                                 
8 Jegadeesh and Titman (1995b) note that skipping a day does not fully control for bid-ask bounce if the 
spread contains a component related to the market maker’s inventory concerns.  
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control for the bid-ask bounce by repeating the experiment with bid returns and find 
similar results. 
Cooper (1999) considers strategies involving the 300 largest NYSE and Amex 
stocks between 1962 and 1993 and present evidence consistent with overreaction.  These 
stocks should be less susceptible to microstructure concerns such as liquidity problems 
and non-trading.  In addition, they are likely to have lower transactions costs, smaller 
spreads, and smaller price pressure effects.  Rather than investing in all securities as in 
Lehmann (1990), Cooper uses filter rules to determine which securities to trade.9  This 
avoids the noise associated with including securities with very small price movements.  
When filters are based on lagged weekly returns, the contrarian strategies are profitable 
over a one week holding period.  Profits are greater with more extreme return filters. 
He also incorporates change in trading volume into the filter rules.  Contrarian 
profits are much stronger in decreasing volume stocks.  There is even evidence of slight 
continuation in increasing volume stocks.  These results are consistent with the model of 
Wang (1994), in which informed investors trade on private information, which predicts 
continuation following extreme returns accompanied by high trading volume.  The result 
is inconsistent, however, with the theoretical work of Campbell, Grossman, and Wang 
(1993) and empirical findings of Conrad, Hameed, and Niden (1994), which are 
discussed above. 
 A recent advance in the theoretical literature is Subrahmanyam (2003), who 
develops a model that includes both microstructure and behavioral effects.  Specifically, 
                                                 
9 Cooper (1999) also considers the Lehmann (1990) strategy with the large cap sample and finds positive 
contrarian profits.  However, these profits are smaller in magnitude than those from the filter rules. 
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this is a framework in which risk averse agents absorb order flow from other investors.  
These market makers have inventory concerns and will require expected return premia 
as compensation to fill liquidity orders.  According to the model, an inventory-based 
explanation for short-run reversals implies a negative relation between returns and 
lagged order imbalance.10  On the other hand, overreaction and corrections suggest a 
negative relation between returns and lagged returns.  Subrahmanyam tests these 
predictions using monthly returns from 1988-1998.  Returns are calculated using the bid-
ask midpoints to circumvent problems associated with bid-ask bounce. 
Monthly cross-sectional regressions reveal that returns are negatively related to 
lagged returns.  Furthermore, a contrarian strategy based on monthly returns earns 
significantly positive profits.  These observations serve as out-of-sample evidence 
consistent with Jegadeesh (1990).  More importantly, lagged order imbalance is 
unrelated to returns when it is the only independent variable the cross-sectional 
regressions.  When lagged order imbalance is included in the cross-sectional regressions 
along with lagged return, the magnitude and significance of the coefficient on lagged 
return is unchanged.  Subrahmanyam concludes that there exist reversals in individual 
short-horizon returns after controlling for bid-ask bounce, and this predictability is 
driven by belief reversion (i.e., overreaction).  However, he also argues (p. 25) that “the 
magnitude of the coefficient is not overwhelmingly high, so that it does not suggest a 
gross violation of market efficiency.”  
 
                                                 
10 A positive (negative) order imbalance occurs when there is a disproportionate number of buy (sell) 
orders. 
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B.  Momentum 
 Individual stock returns are also predictable over 3- to 12-month horizons.  While 
weekly and monthly returns display reversals, returns at these intermediate horizons 
exhibit continuations.  This is referred to as “momentum.”  Researchers have spent much 
of the last decade attempting to explain this phenomenon and have reached no clear 
agreement.  In this section, I will describe the existing evidence related to momentum as 
well as numerous potential explanations. 
 
B.1. The Existence of Momentum 
 Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) are the first to document the momentum 
phenonemon that has received substantial attention over the past decade.  Trading 
strategies that take long positions in stocks characterized as winners over the past three 
to twelve months and short positions in similarly characterized losers earn positive 
profits over the following three to twelve months.  For example, a strategy with a six 
month formation period and a six month holding period (6-6 strategy) generates profits 
around 1% per month.11  These profits are statistically significant and economically 
meaningful. 
 Jegadeesh and Titman evaluate the momentum strategy in the following manner.  
Consider the 6-6 strategy, for example.  Each month, they rank securities in the cross-
section by their prior six-month returns and form equally-weighted decile portfolios.  
Next, they form a zero-investment portfolio that is long the top decile (extreme winners) 
                                                 
11 Subsequent momentum studies find profits of similar magnitudes.  Profits are also shown to be larger 
for small stocks. 
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and short the bottom decile (extreme losers) and hold these positions for the following 
six months.  The portfolios are rebalanced each month.  Since strategies are formed 
every month, there are six open strategies at any point in time (i.e., the portfolios formed 
in months t-1, t-2,…, t-6).  These strategies are referred to as overlapping portfolios.  
The overall momentum portfolio return in month t is the average of the returns to each 
open strategy.  The use of overlapping portfolios increases the power of the test statistics 
used to make inferences. 
 It is possible that the momentum result is either spurious or a result of data 
mining.  For example, Lo and MacKinlay (1990b) argue that, even under market 
efficiency, some anomalous results will surface as countless researchers continuously 
search through the same data set.  Cooper, Gutierrez, and Marcum (2004) cast doubt as 
to whether a real-time investor could recognize the profitability of the momentum 
strategy ex ante.  Even investors that have followed momentum strategies may not 
realize abnormal profits.  Carhart (1997) finds no evidence of abnormal performance for 
mutual funds that employ momentum strategies.  Recent research has also considered the 
profitability of momentum strategies after transactions costs.  The estimates of Lesmond, 
Schill, and Zhou (2004) suggest transactions costs fully offset momentum profits.  On 
the other hand, Korajczyk and Sadka (2003) argue transactions costs reduce, but do not 
eliminate momentum profits, especially in strategies that use value-weighted portfolios.  
In the midst of these criticisms, there exists a substantial body of evidence 
indicating that momentum is a robust phenomenon.  Three out-of-sample tests show that 
momentum is not specific to the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) sample.  Momentum 
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exists in international markets.  Rouwenhorst (1998) finds evidence of momentum in a 
sample of twelve European countries.  Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003) show that 
momentum profits exist in much wider cross-section of countries.  There is also 
momentum in the U.S. market through the 1990s [see Jegadeesh and Titman (2001)].  
Thus, momentum is neither time period nor country specific. 
  
B.2. Momentum and Market Efficiency 
 Several authors have attempted to reconcile momentum with market efficiency.  
In an efficient market, riskier securities are priced with higher expected returns.  If 
winners have, on average, higher expected returns than losers, momentum profits should 
exist.  Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) consider this reasoning but find the winner 
portfolios have smaller betas and larger market caps than the loser portfolios.  Thus, two 
measures of risk – beta and size – suggest the losers are actually riskier than the winners.  
Ultimately, they conclude that momentum is a result of underreaction to firm-specific 
information.  Fama and French (1996) also fail to explain momentum profits using the 3-
factor model from Fama and French (1993).  Rather than concluding markets are 
inefficient, these authors attribute momentum to a failure of the model. 
 Instead of using decile portfolios, Conrad and Kaul (1998) form a momentum 
strategy using weights of the same magnitude, but opposite in sign, of those in Lehmann 
(1990).12  They use Lehmann’s decomposition and attribute momentum profits to cross-
sectional dispersion in expected returns.  Many researchers do not view this finding as 
                                                 
12 Conrad and Kaul (1998) base their weights on 6-month returns, while Lehmann (1990) uses 1-week 
returns. 
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sufficient for reconciling momentum with market efficiency.  First, the empirical 
methodology assumes individual stock returns are stationary over their entire histories.  
Second, if past winners truly have higher expected returns than past losers, momentum 
strategies should be profitable over longer holding period horizons.  Both Lee and 
Swaminathan (2000) and Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) provide direct evidence that this 
is not the case.  They show that momentum profits begin to reverse after about twelve 
months. 
 Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) link momentum profits to lagged 
macroeconomic variables.  They estimate expected return using the one-period ahead 
forecast based on lagged values of the dividend yield, the term premium, the default 
premium, and the t-bill yield.  Momentum profits vanish after controlling for expected 
returns, and the authors conclude that momentum is consistent with rational asset pricing 
and time-varying risk.  This conclusion is not undisputed either.  Cooper, Gutierrez, and 
Hameed (2004) show that momentum profits do not disappear for a strategy that skips a 
month between the formation and holding periods.  It is also possible that the 
macroeconomic variables capture some type of systematic irrationality. 
 Grundy and Martin (2001) also consider time-varying risk as an explanation for 
momentum in efficient markets.  They estimate individual stocks’ expected returns using 
both a 2- and 3-factor model.  These estimates change with every formation period.  
Momentum profits actually increase after controlling for expected returns.  However, 
Grundy and Martin do find that the momentum strategy lost money in over 25% of the 
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months of their sample period.  This suggests that momentum may not be an arbitrage 
opportunity and could still be reflective of a priced factor. 
 The general failure of asset pricing models to explain momentum could indicate 
market inefficiencies.  On the other hand, it could indicate these models are simply the 
“wrong” models.  This is the joint hypothesis problem associated with tests of market 
efficiency.  Ahn, Conrad, and Dittmar (2002) attempt to avoid this problem with a 
stochastic discount factor approach.  This is useful because the tests do not rely on a 
particular asset pricing model.  They show that half of the profits to the Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) strategy can be achieved with a combination of their basis assets, which 
consist of 20 industry portfolios.  Further, when expectations are allowed to vary over 
time, the momentum profits largely disappear.13  This result is consistent with rational 
asset pricing.  One limitation of the analysis, as the authors recognize, is that it assumes 
the set of basis assets are correctly priced. 
 Recent theoretical work also provides hope that momentum can exist in 
conjunction with rational asset pricing.  Brav and Heaton (2002) review this literature.  
They explicitly point out differences between the traditional “efficient markets, rational 
expectations” framework, in which investors are both rational and have access to 
unbiased estimators of the true economic model’s coefficients, and the less restrictive 
“rational structural uncertainty” framework, in which investors are still fully rational, but 
they lack knowledge of the true model’s parameters.  In the latter framework, markets 
are efficient, in that they process current information in a rational manner.  However, the 
                                                 
13 Time-variation in expected returns is based on variation in the S&P 500 dividend yield, the T-bill yield, 
and the Treasury yield spread. 
 23
market’s learning process will result in predictability from the vantage point of the 
econometrician.14  More importantly, Brav and Heaton provide simulation evidence that 
shows rational learning is empirically indistinguishable from patterns predicted by 
underreaction and overreaction theories. 
 
B.3. Underreaction, Overreaction, and Behavioral Finance 
 Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) take the position that momentum profits reflect 
underreaction to firm-specific information.  The market responds to new information, 
but the magnitude of the response is insufficiently small.  Chan, Jegadeesh, and 
Lakonishok (1996) take a similar stance.  They evaluate return patterns following a 
specific informational event, namely earnings surprises.  Earnings surprises are 
measured by standardized unexpected earnings, stock returns around earnings 
announcements, and revisions in analysts’ earnings estimates over a 6-month period.  
Using each measure, they form a strategy that buys stocks with high earnings surprises 
and sells stocks with low earnings surprises.  These strategies generate positive profits 
over a 6- to 12-month holding period.  Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok present 
evidence that this “earnings momentum” is empirically distinct from stock price 
momentum and conclude that both reflect underreaction to firm-specific information. 
 The results of Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) 
present a challenge to a pure underreaction story.  Underreaction predicts cumulative 
momentum profits to flatten once information is fully incorporated into the stock price.  
                                                 
14 See Lewellen and Shanken (2002) for a rational learning model that that illustrates the wedge between 
return distributions perceived by investors and those estimated in empirical tests. 
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Empirically, cumulative profits begin to reverse after about twelve months.  This pattern 
of reversals complements the evidence of DeBondt and Thaler (1985), who report 
positive profits for a contrarian strategy the buys 3-year losers and sells 3-year winners.  
DeBondt and Thaler argue that the stock market overreacts in the long-run and their 
strategy’s profits reflect the subsequent corrections.  The coexistence of intermediate-
term continuation and longer-term reversals poses a challenge to researchers.  One 
outcome is the emergence of the behavioral finance literature.  These papers rely on 
certain cognitive biases (i.e., investor irrationality) to explain documented return patterns. 
 Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) present a behavioral model in which 
investors suffer from two biases.  Conservatism means they do not fully price high-
weight events.  These events, by their very nature, carry substantial valuation 
information.  Quarterly earnings announcements are considered high-weight because of 
their informational content regarding the current status of a firm.  Conservatism results 
in underreaction.  Investors also suffer from the representativeness heuristic.  This is 
marked by the tendency to focus too strongly on high-strength events.  High-strength 
events are events marked by size or extremity.  An example of a high-strength event is a 
long string of positive earnings changes.  Under the representativeness heuristic, 
investors assume such a string is representative of the underlying data generating process 
without considering the likelihood of the pattern persisting into the future.  This bias 
results in overreaction.  Thus, the model presented here predicts underreaction in the 
short-run (momentum) and overreaction in the long run (reversals). 
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 Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) provide a model in which 
investors suffer from two other cognitive biases – overconfidence and biased self-
attribution.  Investors are overconfident about their abilities to process private 
information, resulting in overreaction.  Biased self-attribution refers to how investors 
respond to future signals regarding their private information.  If the private information 
is subsequently confirmed by a public signal, the biased investors become even more 
overconfident.  On the other hand, if there is a disconfirming signal, investors attribute 
the new information to chance and insufficiently revises confidence downward.  Return 
continuation occurs on average.  Eventually, when all information is revealed, 
misvaluations are corrected, resulting in reversals.  Thus, momentum profits are a result 
of continued overreaction, not underreaction as suggested in prior empirical work and 
the model of Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). 
 A third model is provided by Hong and Stein (1999).  Rather than describing 
investors with cognitive biases, Hong and Stein consider two types of investors, 
newswatchers and momentum traders, each of which is rational with respect to available 
information.  According to the model, private information regarding fundamentals 
diffuses slowly to the newswatchers.  This gradual information diffusion leads to 
underreaction and, hence, momentum in stock returns.  Momentum traders cannot 
process fundamental information; they are only able to observe the behavior of the 
newswatchers.  They follow the newswatchers’ trades, arbitraging away any leftover 
underreaction.  Herding by momentum traders eventually leads to overreaction.  
Reversals occur when prices return to their fundamental values.  This model predicts 
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stronger momentum in stocks for which information diffuses slowly.  Hong, Lim, and 
Stein (2000) provide consistent evidence by showing momentum is most profitable in 
the smallest stocks and those with the lowest analyst coverage after controlling for firm 
size. 
 
B.4. Recent Developments 
 Chan (2003) compares momentum profits for firms with and without headline 
news during a 1-month formation period.  The returns of firms with headline news show 
momentum, while the returns of firms without headline news reverse.  He argues that the 
results are consistent with certain ideas from the behavioral finance literature.  The 
momentum could be underreaction to public information since these stocks have news 
announcements, and the reversals could be overreaction to private information, since 
these stocks have extreme returns without news announcements.  Both of these 
predictions are made by Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998).  The results are 
also consistent with the slow reaction to information and feedback trading as in Hong 
and Stein (1999).  However, the evidence shows no link between continuation and 
reversals, as predicted by each theory. 
The market’s pricing of firm-specific news is at the center of much debate in the 
momentum literature.  The empirical papers described above form momentum portfolios 
based on total returns, which are composed of an expected return and an unexpected 
residual.  Since the residual is often viewed as firm-specific news, Gutierrez and 
Pirinsky (2004) examine returns following large residuals to add clarity to the debate.  A 
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momentum strategy that is long stocks with residuals greater than one standard deviation 
and short stocks with residuals less than the negative of one standard deviation generates 
positive profits over the following six months.15  More remarkably, the profits to the 
residual momentum strategy do not reverse over the following five years.  This is in 
stark contrast to the total return momentum strategy of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). 
 A news interpretation of the residual momentum in Gutierrez and Pirinsky (2004) 
is consistent with the findings of Chan (2003).  It is also consistent with Vuolteenaho 
(2002), who uses a vector autoregression to show evidence of continuation following 
cash-flow news.  However, Gutierrez and Pirinsky question the empirical validity of the 
overreaction theories of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Hong and 
Stein (1999) as they find no evidence of reversals.  Residual momentum is consistent 
with underreaction to firm-specific information, but, as Gutierrez and Pirinsky are 
careful to note, underreaction is virtually impossible to distinguish from rational learning 
[Brav and Heaton (2002)].  These recent results clearly pose new challenges to the 
behavioral finance literature. 
 
C. Short-Run Reversals and Momentum 
Researchers have devoted little attention to the coexistence of short-run reversals 
and momentum.  The apparent view from the short-run reversals and momentum 
literatures is that the two phenomena are unrelated.  For example, Jegadeesh and Titman 
                                                 
15 Standard deviations are based on each stock’s own distribution.  The results hold for five different 
models used to estimate residuals.  These strategies are profitable when formed using 1-, 6-, or 36-month 
residuals. 
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(1993) simply acknowledge short-run reversals and skip one week between the 
formation and holding periods to study momentum in isolation.  Other momentum 
studies follow suit by skipping either a week or a month.  Authors justify this practice 
because microstructure issues, such as the bid-ask bounce, that contribute to positive 
short-run contrarian profits will negatively bias the profits of a momentum strategy. 
Attributing short-run reversals to microstructure issues greatly simplifies 
behavioral explanations of momentum.  Existing behavioral theories explain the 
coexistence of intermediate momentum and longer-run reversals.  Adding a short-run 
reversal to momentum and long-run reversal would lead to a much more convoluted 
theory.  Given some of the early evidence on reversals [e.g., Kaul and Nimelendran 
(1990); Conrad, Kaul, and Nimelendran (1991)], this approach is reasonable.  However, 
the more recent evidence in Cooper (1999) and Subrahmanyam (2003) makes the 
argument much less compelling.  In fact, just as Gutierrez and Pirinsky (2004) are 
suggestive that behavioral literature need not link momentum to long-run reversals, the 
overreaction arguments of these recent empirical papers imply that same behavioral 
literature should, in fact, consider short-run reversals. 
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III. DATA AND PRELIMINARY SETUP 
 
A. Data 
 The main sample includes all primary shares traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ between 1963 and 2001, as listed on the CRSP daily return file.16  Weekly 
returns are computed from Wednesday’s close to the following Wednesday’s close.  I 
only consider stocks whose prices exceed five dollars at the end of portfolio formation 
periods.  This removes some initial microstructure concerns associated with thinly traded 
stocks.  Market capitalization and trading volume data are also obtained from CRSP.  
Earnings announcement data are from the quarterly Compustat file. 
 
B. Portfolios 
 I use lagged weekly returns to form portfolios similar to those studied in the 
momentum literature.  Trading strategies are estimated with zero-cost portfolios that are 
long past winners and short past losers.  In all cases examined, positive trading strategy 
profits reflect return continuation, while negative profits represent return reversals.  To 
view my results from the perspective of the short-run contrarian literature, one can 
simply reverse the sign.  This will reflect contrarian, as opposed to momentum, profits. 
 At each point in time, I sort stocks into deciles by their past 1-week return.  The 
1-week total return strategy takes a long position in the top return decile and a short 
position in the bottom return decile.  The winner and loser portfolios are equally 
                                                 
16 Table A-I provides a quick reference for forming the sample as well as defining and evaluating the 
strategies. 
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weighted across stocks.  I examine the profits to the weekly portfolios over various 
holding period windows using a calendar-time method with overlapping portfolios as in 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).  For example, consider the performance of the portfolios 
in weeks t+1 to t+4 (week t represents the formation week).  In a given calendar week τ, 
there are four open strategies – one formed in week τ-1, one formed in week τ-2, and so 
on.  The profit in calendar week τ is the mean profit across the four cohort portfolios.  
This procedure generates a single weekly time series of profits representing the t+1 
through t+4 window. 
 The raw strategy profit (mean return) for a particular holding period window is 
simply the mean of the time series of profits.  I also calculate weekly CAPM and Fama-
French alphas by regressing the time series of strategy profits on the appropriate factors.  
I calculate weekly factor returns by compounding daily factor returns. 17   In these 
regressions, I use a risk free rate derived from the 1-month T-bill return.  Unreported 
tests reveal positive autocorrelation in the various holding period return series. 18  
Therefore, I calculate all test statistics using the consistent estimator of Gallant (1987) 
with four lags.19 
 
  
                                                 
17 I thank Kenneth French for providing daily Fama-French factor data via his website. 
18 For example, the winner and loser portfolio for week t+1 each exhibit positive autocorrelation for the 
first four lags. 
19 I repeated all analysis using eight lags and found similar results. 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
A. Performance of Extreme Return Portfolios 
 Table I reports the profitability of the total return strategy.  There are significant 
reversals of -133 basis points in the first week following portfolio formation.  This 
finding is consistent with prior literature.  Also consistent with prior literature, the 
reversal is relatively short-lived.  Average profit is -47 basis points in weeks one through 
four.20  Table II shows that reversals exist for both past winners and losers.  All of the 
patterns also hold after CAPM and Fama-French adjustments. 
 The main contributions of this study are the performance of the weekly portfolio 
beyond the first four weeks and implications for interpreting immediate reversals.  Table 
I shows the portfolio generates positive profits of about 7 basis points per week in weeks 
five through fifty-two.  These profits are robust to CAPM and Fama-French adjustments.  
So the formation-week returns in fact persist for a year once the brief reversal in returns 
ends.  Moreover, the persistence is spread evenly throughout the year.21  Figure 1 plots 
the cumulative raw profits to the weekly portfolios across the fifty-two weeks, 
estimating the profits in each week separately.22  The figure shows a dramatic run-up in 
the cumulative profits after week four.  The run-up is strong enough in fact to overcome 
the short-run reversal.  The profits in weeks one to fifty-two are significantly positive in  
                                                 
20 In unreported tests, I find reversals decline in magnitude between weeks 1 and 4, with week 4 average 
profit being indistinguishable from 0. 
21 Average profit is 7.36 and 6.68 basis points per week in weeks 5 through 26 and 27 through 52, 
respectively. 
22 Using the calendar time method, I calculate average profits separately for weeks t+1, t+2, and so on.  I 
then report average profits cumulated in event time. 
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Table I 
1-Week Total Return Strategy 
 
Each week, I rank firms in the cross section by their returns over the prior week and form equal-
weighted portfolios for each return decile.  I evaluated a strategy that takes a long position in the 
top decile (“Winners”) and a short position in the bottom decile (“Losers”).  Overlapping 
calendar-time portfolios with weekly rebalancing are considered over various horizons.  
Numbers in the table represent the performance of these portfolios, in basis points, over the 
specified holding period week(s).  The average number of firms in each side of the strategy is 
also provided.  I calculate heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics (in 
parentheses) as in Gallant (1987) using four lags. 
 
     
 Week 1 Weeks 1-4 Weeks 5-52 Weeks 1-52 
     
Mean Return -132.90 -46.72 7.02 2.55 
 (-30.90) (-18.94) (7.08) (2.49) 
     
CAPM Alpha -130.76 -45.07 7.22 2.87 
 (-31.06) (-19.71) (7.46) (2.92) 
     
FF Alpha -131.14 -45.61 7.50 3.34 
 (-31.08) (-18.53) (7.39) (3.24) 
     
Average n 355    
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Table I across the three performance metrics.  Hence, there is no reversal; there is 
actually a continuation. 
 This finding is a complete turnaround for the literature on the short-run 
predictability of individual stock returns.  Reversal has been the stylistic fact of weekly 
returns.  Consequently the underlying sources of reversals have been extensively 
examined.  Controlling for bid-ask bounce, nonsynchronous trading, and dealer 
inventory effects, Jegadeesh and Titman (1995a), Cooper (1999), and Subrahmanyam 
(2003) point toward overreaction as a driver of the reversal.  The findings in Table I 
contradict this notion.  There is no evidence of a correctional reversal.  The extreme 
price changes that occur during the formation week t are not excessive.  To the contrary, 
the abnormal profits are positive in the year following extreme weekly returns. 
 It is important to note that, in contrast to the authors cited above, I have made no 
attempt to control for bid-ask bounce.  Thus, portfolio performance is biased toward 
immediate reversal and negative performance over year one.  This makes the main result 
even more striking – the drift in Table I is strong enough to overshadow an immediate 
reversal that is known to be at least partially spurious.  To eliminate spurious 
autocorrelation induced by bid-ask bounce, I repeat the analysis using returns computed 
from daily closing bid-ask midpoints for NASDAQ stocks from 1983 through 2001.23  
Midpoint returns represent a more precise measure of actual price changes than do 
transaction returns reported by CRSP.  This provides a more accurate depiction of the 
size of the drift relative to the size of the immediate reversal. 
                                                 
23 Bid-to-bid returns produce similar results. 
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Table II 
1-Week Total Return Strategy: Winners and Losers 
 
I report Winners and Losers separately for the strategy defined in Table I.  Overlapping calendar-
time portfolios with weekly rebalancing are considered over various horizons.  Numbers in the 
table represent the performance of these portfolios, in basis points, over the specified holding 
period week(s).  Panel A presents mean returns.  Panel B presents CAPM alphas.  Panel C 
presents Fama-French alphas. The average number of firms in each side of the strategy is also 
provided.  I calculate heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics (in parentheses) 
as in Gallant (1987) using four lags. 
 
 
Panel A: Mean Returns 
     
 Week 1 Weeks 1-4 Weeks 5-52 Weeks 1-52 
Winners -28.38 4.13 27.29 25.59 
 (-4.28) (0.61) (3.80) (3.59) 
     
Losers 104.52 50.85 20.28 23.05 
 (13.76) (6.60) (2.68) (3.05) 
 
Panel B: CAPM Alphas 
     
 Week 1 Weeks 1-4 Weeks 5-52 Weeks 1-52 
Winners -51.30 -19.05 4.05 2.14 
 (-13.91) (-5.52) (1.13) (0.60) 
     
Losers 79.45 26.03 -3.17 -0.76 
 (19.25) (1.25) (-0.81) (-0.19) 
 
Panel C: Fama-French Alphas 
     
 Week 1 Weeks 1-4 Weeks 5-52 Weeks 1-52 
Winners -51.48 -20.44 2.19 0.42 
 (-19.96) (-13.41) (1.56) (0.31) 
     
Losers 79.67 25.17 -5.31 -2.92 
 (27.40) (11.50) (-2.53) (-1.41) 
     
Average n 355    
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Figure 1: Cumulative returns for 1-week total return strategy.  Each week, stocks are ranked 
into equally-weighted deciles based on their returns over the past week.  The total return strategy 
is long the top decile and short the bottom decile.  Cumulative returns for the zero-cost portfolio 
are plotted in event time for the 52 weeks following portfolio formation. 
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 Table III reports average profits of the weekly portfolios using midpoint returns.  
Reversals are dampened, but not eliminated.  Average week one profit is -62 basis points  
as opposed to the -133 basis points reported in Table I.24  The drift is stronger at 12 basis 
points per week over weeks five through fifty-two.  The full first year profit is 9 basis 
points.  Again, all results hold after CAPM and Fama-French adjustments.  Figure 2 
illustrates how the drift dwarfs the immediate reversal.  For an alternative control for 
bid-ask bounce, I skip a day between the formation and holding periods.  Untabulated 
results reveal the week one reversal collapses from -133 basis points to -80 basis points.  
This finding is shown in Figure 2 as well. 
It is of course questionable that any of these profits can be realized in practice 
given trading costs.  This does not imply that the finding of return continuation should 
be ignored though.  Any difficulty in effectively arbitraging this pattern speaks only to 
why the pattern persists, not to why it exists in the first place.  Second, return momentum 
is also detected at longer six- to twelve-month horizons where the effect is more likely to 
generate profits after costs [Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)].25  More importantly, the 
consistency of the pattern across formation horizons indicates that insights into the price-
formation process and why momentum exists can potentially be gained with weekly 
returns.  Lastly, for traders who are committed to buying stocks, trading costs become 
much less of a concern.  That is, if trading costs are to be incurred anyway, this pattern  
                                                 
24 Conrad, Hameed, and Niden (1994) find no profits to their weekly contrarian strategy using midpoint 
returns.  I calculated the profits of my strategy during their time period and also found no significant week 
1 reversals. 
25 The profitability of momentum strategies after transactions costs has sparked recent debate as well.  
Korajczyk and Sadka (2003) argue some profitability survives transactions costs.  Lesmond, Schill, and 
Zhou (2004) provide evidence that transactions costs eliminate momentum profits. 
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Table III 
Midpoint Returns 
 
I calculate Wednesday to Wednesday returns for NASDAQ stocks from 1983 through 2001 
based on closing bid-ask midpoints.  Each week, I rank firms in the cross section by their returns 
over the prior week and form equal-weighted portfolios for each return decile.  I evaluate a 
strategy that takes a long position in the top decile (“Winners”) and a short position in the 
bottom decile (“Losers”).  Overlapping calendar-time portfolios with weekly rebalancing are 
considered over various horizons.  Numbers in the table represent the performance of these 
portfolios, in basis points, over the specified holding period week(s).  The average number of 
firms in each side of the strategy is also provided.  I calculate heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent t-statistics (in parentheses) as in Gallant (1987) using four lags. 
 
     
 Week 1 Weeks 1-4 Weeks 5-52 Weeks 1-52 
     
Mean Return -62.33 -28.43 12.47 8.64 
 (-7.93) (-6.30) (6.23) (4.43) 
     
CAPM Alpha -58.32 -25.56 12.56 8.98 
 (-7.58) (-6.23) (6.36) (4.73) 
     
FF Alpha -60.91 -29.07 12.05 8.28 
 (-7.86) (-6.27) (5.63) (3.94) 
     
Average n 226    
     
 
 38
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52
Week
Pr
of
it 
(%
) Total Return
Midpoint
Residual
Skip Day
 
Figure 2: Cumulative returns for various strategies.  Cumulative returns of four variant 
strategies are plotted in event time for the 52 weeks following portfolio formation.  The total 
return strategy from Figure 1 is shown for reference purposes.  Under the midpoint strategy, 
returns are calculate according to closing bid-ask midpoints (using NASDAQ data from 
November 1983 through December 2001.  The residual strategy forms portfolios based on 
market model forecast errors scaled by respective residual standard deviations.  The strategy is 
long stocks with forecast errors greater than two standard deviations and short stocks with 
forecast errors less than negative two standard deviations.  The skip day strategy selects the same 
stocks as the total return strategy, but skips one day between the formation and holding periods. 
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of return continuation can still be valuable to traders deciding which stocks on the 
margin to invest in. 26         
 
B.  Short-Run Reversals and Post Earnings Announcement Drift 
 A large literature finds return persistence for several months following certain 
corporate news events.  The most well-known of these events is an earnings surprise [see, 
for example, Bernard and Thomas (1989)].  Other events associated with persistence 
include stock splits, dividend initiations and omissions, and seasoned equity offerings 
[see Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Fama (1998) for reviews].  The 
salient feature is that announcement returns and subsequent drift have the same sign.  
This literature markedly differs from the weekly return predictability literature, which 
strictly associates extreme returns with reversals. 27   In this section, I explore these 
differences, focusing on return predictability following earnings announcements.  This 
analysis provides further insight into the sources of reversals and continuation. 
To begin, note that while the aforementioned event study literature associates 
certain events with average abnormal announcement returns, these returns are not 
necessarily in the total return extremes.  For example, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok 
(1996) report abnormal returns on the four days around earnings surprises.  Average 
abnormal returns are 2.2% and -2.3% around positive and negative surprises, 
respectively.  In my total return strategy, average return for the winners and losers are 
                                                 
26 This discussion assumes that the trends in returns are mispricings that should be arbitraged if possible.  
They may not be mispricings.  Brav and Heaton (2002) and others show how patterns in returns can be 
consistent with rational learning.   
27 Note also that even event studies that do not find post event drift rarely report evidence of immediate 
reversals. 
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12.0% and -8.7%.  In light of this, I facilitate a more direct comparison between the 
short-run reversal and post-event drift literatures by considering stocks with both 
earnings announcements and extreme stock returns. 
I obtain earnings announcement dates from the quarterly Compustat file.  I 
restrict the universe to include, for a given firm, weekly returns beginning three months 
prior to its first available quarterly earnings announcement date and ending the date of 
its final earnings announcement.28  This allows me to accurately determine whether or 
not an earnings announcement has occurred for every firm-week in the sample.  Weekly 
winners and losers are defined as before using this restricted universe, which spans the 
time period from 1971 through 2001.  I divide the winner and loser portfolios each into 
two groups based on whether an earnings announcement occurred during the formation 
week.  This portfolio formation makes the magnitudes of formation week returns 
roughly comparable across earnings announcement groups.  A given strategy cohort only 
trades following formation periods when there are at least ten stocks selected in each of 
the winner and loser portfolios.  Requiring a minimum number of stocks reduces 
heteroskedasticity in the calendar time portfolios returns and increases the precision in 
the estimation of factor loadings. 
 Table IV reports the profits of the two earnings announcement groups 
separately.29  There are clear differences across groups.  The results in Panel A are based  
                                                 
28 For firms whose final earnings announcement is within three months of the end of the CRSP returns file, 
I include returns through the last date available. 
29 Because I report differences across groups, average profits for the no announcement group are 
calculated only using the observations when both groups trade.  The strategies trade following 78% of all 
possible formation weeks.  Results for the no announcement group using all possible observations are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in Table IV. 
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Table IV 
Earnings Announcement Groups 
 
I restrict the universe to only include firms with available earnings announcement data.  Using 
this restricted universe, I define Winners and Losers as in Table I.  I then separate the resulting 
portfolios into those experiencing an earnings announcement (ANN) during the formation week 
and those that did not (NO ANN).  I report results for each earnings announcement group 
separately as well as the difference between the groups. The average number of firms in each 
side of the strategy is also provided.  Panel A presents results based on transactions returns as 
reported in the CRSP returns file.  Panel B presents results based on NASDAQ returns from 
1983 to 2001 calculated using closing bid-ask midpoints.  I calculate heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent t-statistics (in parentheses) as in Gallant (1987) using four lags. 
 
 
Panel A: Transactions Returns (Winners – Losers) 
 Week 1  Weeks 5-26 
 ANN NO ANN Difference  ANN NO ANN Difference
        
Mean Return -61.98 -145.57 83.59  20.75 5.41 15.35 
 (-8.40) (-24.05) (11.89)  (10.74) (3.30) (9.79) 
        
CAPM Alpha -61.25 -143.73 82.48  20.89 5.79 15.11 
 (-8.37) (-23.88) (11.90)  (10.81) (3.62) (9.66) 
        
FF Alpha -61.88 -145.82 83.95  20.27 5.64 14.64 
 (-8.30) (-24.57) (12.16)  (10.53) (3.41) (9.57) 
        
Average n 39 275      
 
 Weeks 5-52  Weeks 1-52 
 ANN NO ANN Difference  ANN NO ANN Difference
        
Mean Return 14.68 5.99 8.69  12.37 1.25 11.12 
 (9.59) (5.05) (7.31)  (8.14) (1.03) (9.59) 
        
CAPM Alpha 14.69 6.16 8.53  12.45 1.53 10.91 
 (9.57) (5.29) (7.14)  (8.21) (1.31) (9.39) 
        
FF Alpha 14.17 6.35 7.81  11.82 1.63 10.19 
 (9.09) (5.20) (6.89)  (7.49) (1.31) (9.03) 
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Table IV: continued 
 
 
Panel B: Midpoint Returns (Winners – Losers) 
 Week 1  Weeks 5-26 
 ANN NO ANN Difference  ANN NO ANN Difference
        
Mean Return -14.18 -101.21 87.03  26.27 11.09 15.18 
 (-1.15) (-8.12) (7.22)  (7.11) (4.25) (4.88) 
        
CAPM Alpha -9.77 -94.96 85.20  26.73 11.76 14.98 
 (-0.79) (-7.69) (7.08)  (7.29) (4.66) (4.78) 
        
FF Alpha -13.06 -98.67 85.60  25.34 11.00 14.34 
 (-1.04) (-8.13) (7.17)  (6.81) (4.08) (4.69) 
        
Average n 32 177      
 
 Weeks 5-52  Weeks 1-52 
 ANN NO ANN Difference  ANN NO ANN Difference
        
Mean Return 17.34 10.14 7.20  17.10 6.16 10.94 
 (5.76) (5.13) (2.79)  (5.69) (3.08) (4.54) 
        
CAPM Alpha 17.52 10.33 7.18  17.49 6.56 10.92 
 (5.87) (5.30) (2.79)  (5.93) (3.38) (4.58) 
        
FF Alpha 16.07 10.01 6.06  15.69 5.99 9.69 
 (5.14) (4.74) (2.33)  (5.00) (2.81) (3.96) 
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on transaction returns.  The earnings announcement group displays a weaker immediate 
reversal at -62 basis points as opposed to -146 basis points for the no announcement 
group.  This difference is highly statistically significant (t=11.89).  Moreover, extreme 
weekly returns that are accompanied by earnings announcements display stronger drift 
than those unaccompanied by earnings announcements.  For example, the mean weekly 
return in weeks 5 through 26 is about 20 basis points for the announcement group and 
about 5 basis points for the no announcement group.  The difference is highly significant.  
This suggests the persistence of weekly returns in the unconditional strategy may be 
related to post earnings announcement drift. 
Panel B repeats the analysis using midpoint returns for NASDAQ stocks from 
1983 through 2001 to control for bid-ask bounce.  In this case, week one profit is 
indistinguishable from zero for the announcement group, while it remains significantly 
negative at -101 basis points for the no announcement group.  As with the transaction 
returns, the drift is reliably greater for the announcement group.  But even for the no 
announcement group, average profit over the full year is positive and statistically 
significant.  The implication is that the market’s (seemingly insufficient) response to 
earnings announcements does not fully explain the persistence of weekly returns in 
general.  In other words, weekly returns still persist, even if they are not accompanied by 
earnings announcements. 
These findings speak to the nature of return predictability following weekly 
extreme returns.  The evidence appears consistent with a market that responds to news 
with a delay.  Moreover, in the case of earnings announcements, the news effect is so 
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strong that, after controlling for bid-ask bounce, it offsets any tendency to reverse even 
in the first week.  This is also consistent with the fact that event studies, in which stocks 
are explicitly identified by information releases, often document post event drift, but 
rarely identify immediate reversals. 
The evidence thus far points to two components in extreme returns that are 
related to diametrically opposite patterns in future returns.  I conjecture there is a news 
component that drifts for about a year and a second, non-news component that briefly 
reverses.  Reversals are unlikely due to time-varying expected returns as expected 
returns are close to zero over a one week period.  However, microstructure issues such as 
temporary price pressure or price setting by specialists with inventory concerns both 
should ultimately be reversed and are a likely culprit for the non-news component. 
If these competing effects exist, the strength of drift and reversal in a portfolio is 
a function of the relative news and non-news components in the returns of its member 
stocks.  All else equal, larger news underlying extreme returns should result in weaker 
reversal and stronger drift.  Alternatively, the reversal effect should dominate, especially 
in the short run, when news is not present.  Since every stock selected in the 
announcement group has, by definition, experienced news, its stronger drift is consistent 
with my conjecture.  Moreover, there are undoubtedly stocks in the no announcement 
group experiencing value-relevant news as well, but this subset is unlikely to encompass 
the entire group.  Extreme returns in the no announcement group are thus a more 
imprecise characterization of news than those in the announcement group.  Stronger 
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reversal and weaker drift in the no announcement group are therefore also consistent 
with my conjecture. 
 
C. Cross-Sectional Regressions 
In this section, I examine how the short-run return reversals are related to firm-
specific news in a more general context.  If (i) the reversals are solely due to 
microstructure issues and not to firm-specific news per se and (ii) there tends to be 
return continuation after firm-specific news, then I should be able to isolate a marginal 
positive effect of news on week t+1 returns. That is, controlling for total returns, the 
finding of a positive relation between news in week t and returns in week t+1 strongly 
supports the notion that reversals are microstructure driven and news persists in returns. 
My proxy for firm-specific news is formed using the residual return from the 
market model     
 itMtiiit εrβαr ++=  (1) 
where rit is the return on stock i in week t, αi and βi are coefficients, rMt is the return on 
the CRSP value-weighted index in week t, and εit is the firm-specific residual return.  I 
estimate the market-model coefficients for each stock with a regression of weekly 
returns over the window [t-260, t-1], requiring a minimum of 104 observations over this 
time period.  This is equivalent to the common practice of estimating coefficients over 
the prior five years and requiring at least 24 months of observations.  I calculate the 
residual return in week t using the estimated coefficients as   
 .rβˆαˆrεˆ Mtiiitit −−=  (2) 
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My measure of firm-specific news is scaled residual (RES).  RESt is the residual return 
in week t scaled by the standard error of the residual return from the regression.  Scaling 
the residuals serves to increase the signal-to-noise ratio since it accounts for the volatility 
of a given stock’s return.  Essentially, the scaled residuals identify the unusual residual 
returns, which better defines news than do total returns.  This measure has the added 
advantage of not requiring the identification of specific news announcements. 
Before testing for a marginal effect of news, I form portfolios based upon my 
measure of firm-specific news.  The portfolios are long stocks with scaled residuals in 
week t greater than or equal to two and short stocks with scaled residuals less than or 
equal to negative two.  In other words, the portfolios are long in good news and short in 
bad news.  The profits are estimated as before.  The results are equivalent to those for the 
total-return portfolios, and therefore are not tabulated. Again I see the short-run reversal 
in the first four weeks and again I see the persistent run-up in the profits from week five 
through fifty-two.  Figure 2 displays the mean cumulative profits for these news 
portfolios.  The conclusion is the same as the one for the total-return portfolios. There is 
no overreaction.  To the contrary, the profits in the fifty-two weeks following the 
formation period are again significantly positive.   
The finding of a short-run reversal in the news portfolio confirms that any 
positive effect news may have on future returns is, at least in the unconditional strategy, 
overcome by the strength of the immediate reversal.  I now explicitly look for a marginal 
positive effect in week one.  To this end, I estimate weekly cross-sectional regressions, 
 47
similar to the method of Fama and MacBeth (1973).  Each week I estimate the following 
regression across all available stocks,  
 ti,1t,i21t,i10it ξRESλrλλr +++= −−  (3) 
where rit is the return on stock i in week t, λk is a coefficient for k = 0,1, and 2, RESi,t-1 is 
the scaled residual from equation (2), and 
ti,
ξ  is an error term.  The means of the weekly 
time-series of coefficients on prior return and prior news are reported in Table V along 
with the t-statistics.  
 The dependent variable in Panel A is raw return.  In this regression, I see a 
marginal positive effect of last week’s news controlling for last week’s return.  Also, as 
expected, raw return is negatively related to last week’s return.  I consider risk-adjusted 
returns in Panels B and C.  The dependent variable in Panel B is the CAPM residual; 
Panel C uses the Fama and French (1993) residual.  In both cases, the positive relation 
between last week’s news and this week’s return is positive and highly significant.  Thus, 
the risk adjustments strengthen the main result.  This finding strongly reiterates that the 
literature’s conclusion of weekly reversals being due in part to an overreaction to news is 
misplaced.  Even in week one, I find evidence of firm-specific news persisting.   
 Viewing all results together, the market’s response to the news in week t is 
anything but an overreaction.  I find that abnormal returns are positive in the year 
following the formation week.  Note that I extend the examination window of the 
extreme-return portfolios to three years (not in tables) and find no evidence of a reversal 
in the post-formation period.  For the news portfolio, the profits in weeks t+1 to t+156  
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Table V 
Cross-Sectional Regressions 
 
Each week t, I regress return variables on lagged return (RETt-1), lagged scaled residual (RESt-1), 
and interactions with EXT.  Scaled residual is constructed as follows: (1) I estimate a market 
model by regressing weekly return on the CRSP value-weighted index. (2) I compute one period 
ahead forecast errors.  (3) Scaled residual is the forecast error scaled by the residual standard 
deviation from the market model estimation.  The dependent variable in Panel A is raw return.  
Dependent variables in Panels B and C are out-of-sample CAPM and Fama-French residuals, 
respectively.  I report the time-series means (multiplied by 100) and t-statistics for the regression 
coefficients.   
 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable is raw return 
Intercept RETt-1 RESt-1 Average n Average R2 
     
0.29 -6.52 3.06 2981 1.35 
(6.76) (-15.24) (1.68)   
     
 
Panel B: Dependent variable is CAPM residual 
Intercept RETt-1 RESt-1 Average n Average R2 
     
0.10 -7.38 6.54 3015 1.04 
(4.51) (-24.02) (4.74)   
     
 
Panel C: Dependent variable is Fama French residual 
Intercept RETt-1 RESt-1 Average n Average R2 
     
0.05 -9.14 12.07 3015 1.10 
(3.85) (-31.72) (9.79)   
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remain significantly positive, consistent with the literature on post-event continuation in 
returns.  
 
D. Robustness Tests and Additional Analysis 
D.1. Pre-Formation Performance 
 If the weekly strategy happens to select stocks that are already drifting prior to 
formation, then the holding period performance is not directly attributable to extreme 
weekly returns per se.  In other words, return drift may simply be a characteristic of 
certain stocks both prior to and following the formation week.  For example, researchers 
beginning with Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) have documented a robust momentum 
effect in stock returns – extreme winners defined over three to twelve months continue 
to outperform losers for up to one year.  If weekly winners are already outperforming 
losers before portfolio formation, the drift documented in Table I is more a product of 
model misspecification than a continuation of weekly returns. 
 Table VI reports average profits in calendar time for various windows prior to the 
extreme return event.  Average profit is insignificantly different from zero over weeks t-
52 through t-5.  This result is robust to both the CAPM and Fama-French adjustments.  
Thus, there is no evidence of pre-formation drift.  In addition, profits in weeks t-4 
through t-1 closely resemble those for weeks t+1 through t+4.  Ball, Kothari, and Wasley 
(1995) attribute these “pre-formation reversals” to bid-ask bounce.  It is known that 
formation week winners are more likely to have traded at the ask, which biases week one 
returns downward.  Ball, Kothari, and Wasley note that formation week winners are also  
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Table VI 
1-Week Total Return Strategy: Past Returns 
 
I define Winners and Losers as in Table I.  Using overlapping calendar-time portfolios, I 
calculate profits of the Winner – Loser zero-cost portfolio in the weeks prior to formation.  The 
average number of firms in each side of the strategy is also provided.  I calculate 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics (in parentheses) as in Gallant (1987) 
using four lags. 
 
    
 Weeks 
-52 to -5 
Weeks 
-4 to -1 
Week 
-1 
    
Mean Return 0.61 -61.58 -160.19 
 (0.76) (-24.73) (-34.22) 
    
CAPM Alpha 1.19 -61.08 -159.41 
 (1.56) (-24.33) (-34.01) 
    
FF Alpha -0.04 -61.13 -160.26 
 (-0.05) (-24.74) (-33.63) 
    
Average n 355   
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more likely to have traded at the bid in the prior week, which biases pre-formation 
returns downward as well.  Pre-formation returns of losers are biased in the opposite 
direction. 
 
D.2. Reversal and No Reversal Groups 
 During the year following portfolio formation, long-run return persistence 
dominates the immediate reversal yielding positive average weekly profits.  My 
interpretation is that extreme weekly returns are not overreactions on average.  However, 
what if the market overreacts to certain types of information and underreacts to others?30  
If so, one subset of stocks only reverses, while another subset only drifts.  I address this 
concern here.  Rather than attempting to pick the stocks that will ultimately reverse using 
only formation-week information, I impose a look-ahead bias and identify them directly.  
I then evaluate total return profits separately for stocks that do and do not reverse. 
 The reversal (no reversal) group contains stocks selected by the total return 
strategy whose week t and t+1 market-adjusted returns are of opposite (same) sign.  
Table VII evaluates these strategies beginning in week t+2.  The no reversal group 
(Panel A) shows a brief reversal going forward.  This is presumably due to bid-ask 
bounce as the winners all had positive market-adjusted returns in week t+1 and losers 
had negative market-adjusted returns.  Persistence beginning in week five is strong and 
significant.  Thus, this group has strong drift and, by construction, no week t+1 reversal.  
The reversal group (Panel B) has strong positive profits in week t+2, also likely due to 
                                                 
30 Overreacting and underreacting to different types of information is a key concept in the behavioral 
theory of Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). 
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Table VII 
Reversal and No-Reversal Groups 
 
Stocks selected by the total return strategy in week t are grouped according to their week t+1 
market-adjusted returns.  The no reversal group (Panel A) contains stocks with week t and week 
t+1 returns of the same sign.  The reversal group (Panel B) contains stocks with week t and week 
t+1 returns of opposite sign.  Overlapping calendar-time portfolios with weekly rebalancing are 
considered over various horizons.  Numbers in the table represent the performance of these 
portfolios, in basis points, over the specified holding period week(s).  The average number of 
firms in each side of the strategy is also provided.  I calculate heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent t-statistics (in parentheses) as in Gallant (1987) using four lags. 
 
 
Panel A: No Week 1 Reversal 
     
 Week 2 Weeks 2-4 Weeks 5-52 Weeks 2-52 
Mean Return -126.02 -56.38 10.62 6.39 
 (-23.32) (-14.08) (6.53) (3.87) 
     
CAPM Alpha -122.95 -54.09 10.81 6.71 
 (-23.90) (-14.55) (6.78) (4.19) 
     
FF Alpha -123.11 -54.59 11.46 7.50 
 (-23.26) (-13.63) (6.90) (4.48) 
     
Avg. n (winners) 149    
Avg. n (losers) 168    
 
Panel B: Week 1 Reversal 
     
 Week 2 Weeks 2-4 Weeks 5-52 Weeks 2-52 
Mean Return 27.98 15.28 3.93 4.76 
 (7.29) (7.83) (7.60) (9.20) 
     
CAPM Alpha 28.67 15.75 4.07 4.91 
 (7.53) (8.18) (7.95) (9.67) 
     
FF Alpha 29.03 14.95 4.19 4.86 
 (7.39) (7.57) (8.06) (9.26) 
     
Avg. n (winners) 206    
Avg. n (losers) 187    
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throughout the year.  So even by selecting stocks that reverse immediately, I am unable 
to eliminate the return persistence. 
 The fact that the drift in the no reversal group is much stronger than that in the 
reversal group is not surprising.  These stocks have stronger return shocks – positive 
returns over the formation period are reinforced by positive returns in the subsequent 
week.  In fact, the average return of the spread portfolio in week one is about 10%.  On 
the other hand, the stocks in the reversal group experience strong returns in week one 
that are in the opposite direction of their formation week returns.  Average week one 
return of this spread portfolio is about -10%.  The average net return shock of the spread 
portfolio is still positive over the first two weeks, but it is much smaller than that for the 
no reversal group.  To the extent that the size of the drift is related to the magnitude of  
the net return shock over weeks t and t+1, we should expect greater drift for the no 
reversal group. 
 
D.3. Subsample Results 
In this section, I discuss the robustness of my prior findings for the total-return 
portfolios across size, time periods, and trading volume. I first split the sample at the 
thirtieth and seventieth percentiles of market capitalization using NYSE stocks only to 
identify the breakpoints.  This produces three subsets of stocks: small, medium, and 
large.  Table VIII shows that the short-run reversals are decreasing in size, and the 
profits across weeks five to fifty-two are also decreasing in size.  Both the brief reversal 
and the subsequent continuation in returns are significant even in the large-cap stocks.  
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Table VIII 
Size Subsamples 
 
I form Winner and Loser portfolios as in Table I within three size groups.  The small subsample, 
presented in Panel A, considers stocks with market capitalization below the 30th NYSE 
percentile at the time of portfolio formation.  The medium subsample, presented in Panel B, 
considers stocks with market capitalization between the 30th and 70th NYSE percentiles.  The 
large subsample, presented in Panel C, considers stocks with market capitalization greater than 
the 70th NYSE percentile.  Overlapping calendar-time portfolios with weekly rebalancing are 
considered over various horizons.  Numbers in the table represent the performance of these 
portfolios, in basis points, over the specified holding period week(s).  The average number of 
firms in each side of the strategy is also provided.  I calculate heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent t-statistics (in parentheses) as in Gallant (1987) using four lags. 
 
 
Panel A: Small Stocks (Winners – Losers) 
     
 Week 1 Weeks 1-4 Weeks 5-52 Weeks 1-52 
Mean Return -158.74 -57.96 7.73 2.20 
 (-31.94) (-22.94) (8.13) (2.18) 
     
CAPM Alpha -156.57 -56.26 8.02 2.62 
 (-32.08) (-23.90) (8.73) (2.71) 
     
FF Alpha -156.95 -56.70 8.07 2.98 
 (-32.04) (-22.51) (8.35) (2.99) 
     
Average n 213    
 
Panel B: Medium Stocks (Winners – Losers) 
     
 Week 1 Weeks 1-4 Weeks 5-52 Weeks 1-52 
Mean Return -109.04 -38.42 5.64 1.95 
 (-23.54) (-13.83) (4.97) (1.70) 
     
CAPM Alpha -106.80 -36.70 5.79 2.23 
 (-23.68) (-14.10) (5.16) (2.00) 
     
FF Alpha -106.64 -37.36 6.00 2.63 
 (-23.46) (-13.38) (5.09) (2.22) 
     
Average n 94    
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Table VIII: continued 
 
 
Panel C: Large Stocks (Winners – Losers) 
     
 Week 1 Weeks 1-4 Weeks 5-52 Weeks 1-52 
Mean Return -77.73 -25.03 3.60 1.24 
 (-16.85) (-9.25) (3.14) (1.09) 
     
CAPM Alpha -75.94 -23.76 3.48 1.22 
 (-16.65) (-9.16) (3.01) (1.07) 
     
FF Alpha -77.56 -24.82 4.39 2.09 
 (-16.57) (-8.81) (3.82) (1.81) 
     
Average n 48    
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The large-cap profits across weeks one to fifty-two though only show evidence of being 
positive using the Fama-French alphas. 
Table IX gives the portfolio profits dividing the sample into two subperiods from 
1963 to 1982 and from 1983 to 2001.  The brief reversals and the subsequent 
continuations remain evident across both subperiods.  The finding that the profits are 
significantly positive in the year following the formation week is strong in the latter 
subperiod. The fifty-two week post-formation profits are positive in the former 
subperiod only in the Fama-French alphas.  The profits in the first subperiod are, 
however, never negative.  So the conclusion that the formation-week returns are not 
overreactions is robust across subperiods.    
I also observe how the profits change with trading volume (per share).  The 
interest here is in furthering our empirical understanding of the complex relation 
between volume and returns.  Volume-return theories recognize that the motivations for 
trading can imply particular effects on future returns.  As noted by Llorente et al. (2002), 
a high volume of liquidity trading should result in price pressure that will be reversed, 
while a high volume of informed trading should diminish the reversal since the private 
information is positively related to future returns.  Llorente et al. provide a thorough 
discussion of the work on returns and volume, and I refer interested readers there.  
Llorente et al. use size as a proxy for information asymmetry and argue that high-volume 
returns in small stocks should display less of a reversal as the trades are more likely to be 
informed trades. They find supporting evidence.  
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Table IX 
Subperiods 
 
I evaluate the strategies in Table I over two subperiods.  The early subperiod, presented in Panel 
A, covers 1963 to 1982.  The late subperiod, presented in Panel B, covers 1983 to 2001.  
Overlapping calendar-time portfolios with weekly rebalancing are considered over various 
horizons.  Numbers in the table represent the performance of these portfolios, in basis points, 
over the specified holding period week(s).  The average number of firms in each side of the 
strategy is also provided.  I calculate heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics 
(in parentheses) as in Gallant (1987) using four lags. 
 
 
Panel A: 1963 to 1982 
     
 Week 1 Weeks 1-4 Weeks 5-52 Weeks 1-52 
Mean Return -131.82 -53.25 5.81 0.60 
 (-23.97) (-19.18) (5.29) (0.51) 
     
CAPM Alpha -130.38 -52.50 5.98 0.83 
 (-24.29) (-20.28) (5.71) (0.75) 
     
FF Alpha -129.57 -51.22 6.61 2.00 
 (-23.34) (-18.87) (6.29) (1.86) 
     
Average n 272    
 
Panel B: 1983 to 2001 
     
 Week 1 Weeks 1-4 Weeks 5-52 Weeks 1-52 
Mean Return -134.67 -40.00 8.25 4.56 
 (-20.20) (-9.83) (4.98) (2.72) 
     
CAPM Alpha -130.86 -37.20 8.39 4.90 
 (-19.95) (-10.01) (5.10) (2.99) 
     
FF Alpha -132.69 -39.80 8.30 4.61 
 (-20.72) (-9.66) (4.70) (2.57) 
     
Average n 440    
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I separate the stock universe into those stocks whose volume increases in week t 
relative to week t-1 and those stocks whose volume decreases in week t.  I then form 
total return portfolios as before using all available stocks and then using the small-cap, 
medium-cap, and large-cap subsets.  Table X reports the portfolios’ profits and the test 
for a difference in profits across the increasing-volume and decreasing-volume portfolios.  
Short-run reversals are stronger for the extreme-return stocks with increasing volume in 
week t.  This holds for all stocks except the large-cap stocks (Panel D).  Volume 
however has no effect on the continuations in weeks five to fifty-two; the return 
continuations are significant in each subsample but not different across the volume 
categories.  Although not in the tables, the fifty-two week post-formation performance is  
never negative in any of the subsamples considered.  There is never evidence of 
overreaction. 
The finding of stronger short-run reversals in small stocks with increasing 
volume is inconsistent with the predictions and the findings of Llorente et al. (2002), 
who use daily returns, a different testing method, and a different stock sample.  My 
finding that conditioning on volume only has an impact on the short-run returns further 
indicates that higher volume in my sample is more associated with inducing temporary 
price pressure than with identifying more informed trading.  My findings also disagree 
with those of Cooper (1999) who examines various contrarian strategies on large-cap 
stocks conditioning on return and volume filters.  My findings are more generally 
supportive of those of Conrad, Hameed, and Niden (1994) who examine NASDAQ 
stocks only.  They also find that reversals are greater in high-volume returns.  As  
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Table X 
Share Turnover Subsamples 
 
I divide the sample into two subsamples based on changes in share turnover during the formation 
week.  Within each subsample, I form Winner and Loser portfolios as in Table I.  Panel A 
presents results separately for firms with increasing and decreasing share turnover during the 
formation week.  Panels B – D present the share turnover subsample results within each of size 
groupings used in Table II.  Overlapping calendar-time portfolios with weekly rebalancing are 
considered over various horizons.  Numbers in the table represent the performance of these 
portfolios, in basis points, over the specified holding period week(s).  The average number of 
firms in each side of the strategy is also provided.  I calculate heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent t-statistics (in parentheses) as in Gallant (1987) using four lags. 
 
 Week 1  Weeks 5-52 
 Increasing Turnover 
Decreasing 
Turnover Difference  
Increasing 
Turnover 
Decreasing 
Turnover Difference
 
Panel A: All Stocks (Winners – Losers) 
        
Mean Return -159.61 -137.48 -22.13  7.81 5.17 2.64 
 (-32.43) (-30.47) (-4.88)  (5.43) (3.78) (1.36) 
        
CAPM Alpha -157.57 -135.23 -22.35  7.47 6.06 1.41 
 (-32.55) (-30.64) (-4.95)  (5.20) (4.94) (0.77) 
        
FF Alpha -157.79 -135.81 -21.99  8.09 6.21 1.88 
 (-32.09) (-31.99) (-4.93)  (5.80) (5.89) (1.33) 
        
Average n 146 155      
 
Panel B: Small Stocks (Winners – Losers) 
        
Mean Return -211.68 -169.00 -42.68  8.42 6.75 1.67 
 (-34.26) (-31.92) (-6.59)  (6.10) (5.04) (0.86) 
        
CAPM Alpha -209.81 -166.67 -43.14  8.05 7.86 1.91 
 (-34.38) (-31.97) (-6.70)  (5.84) (6.60) (0.10) 
        
FF Alpha -209.63 -167.42 -42.21  8.81 7.17 1.64 
 (-33.73) (-33.40) (-6.51)  (6.48) (6.69) (1.07) 
        
Average n 82 87      
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Table X: Continued 
 
 Week 1  Weeks 5-52 
 Increasing Turnover 
Decreasing 
Turnover Difference  
Increasing 
Turnover 
Decreasing 
Turnover Difference
 
Panel C: Medium Stocks (Winners – Losers) 
        
Mean Return -120.39 -109.43 -10.97  6.25 5.32 0.93 
 (-21.27) (-20.97) (-2.10)  (3.94) (4.09) (0.54) 
        
CAPM Alpha -118.46 -107.40 -11.06  5.83 6.16 -0.34 
 (-21.25) (-21.02) (-2.13)  (3.68) (5.19) (-0.21) 
        
FF Alpha -118.11 -106.95 -11.16  6.51 5.85 0.66 
 (-21.06) (-21.12) (-2.13)  (4.09) (4.98) (0.46) 
        
Average n 41 43      
 
Panel D: Large Stocks (Winners – Losers) 
        
Mean Return -73.27 -74.97 1.70  4.35 2.39 1.96 
 (-12.90) (-14.14) (0.32)  (2.81) (2.22) (1.38) 
        
CAPM Alpha -72.12 -73.52 1.40  3.95 2.65 1.30 
 (-12.88) (-14.18) (0.27)  (2.54) (2.49) (0.93) 
        
FF Alpha -73.17 -75.45 2.28  5.11 3.58 1.53 
 (-12.52) (-14.71) (0.42)  (3.45) (3.35) (1.22) 
        
Average n 23 24      
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Llorente et al. point out, the return-volume dynamics are quite complicated and current 
models do not capture all aspects.  They argue that their model is sufficient though to 
link return-volume patterns to the underlying motives of trade.  If this is so, then trading 
motives change across stocks and across time.   
 
D.4. Seasonality 
 I consider seasonal variation in the performance of the portfolios.  Table XI 
reports January and non-January trading profits separately.  Immediate reversals are 
present in both January and non-January months, with January reversals being visibly 
stronger.  Seasonal differences do exist in longer holding periods.  In the year following  
 formation, average January profit is negative.  However, non-January profits are reliably 
positive.  This result is similar to that of the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) momentum 
strategy.  Authors such as Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) have attributed such seasonal 
patterns to tax loss selling behavior. 
 
 E. Discussion and Fit 
 The evidence presented in this dissertation is inconsistent with a market that 
systematically overreacts to new information.  The fact that weekly returns persist for a 
full year suggests that if there is any misreaction at all, it is an underreaction.  So why, 
then, do weekly returns reverse?  The leading contender offered in the literature is 
market microstructure issues.  Measuring such issues however has proven to be a 
daunting task.  A novelty of my approach is that it need not directly measure these issues.   
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Table XI 
January Seasonality of Total Return Profits 
 
I evaluate the Total Return Strategy in January and non-January months separately.  Panel A 
reports January results.  Panel B reports non-January results.  Overlapping calendar-time 
portfolios with weekly rebalancing are considered over various horizons.  Numbers in the table 
represent the performance of these portfolios, in basis points, over the specified holding period 
week(s).  The average number of firms in each side of the strategy is also provided.  I calculate 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics (in parentheses) as in Gallant (1987) 
using four lags. 
 
 
Panel A: January 
     
 Week 1 Weeks 1-4 Weeks 5-52 Weeks 1-52 
     
Mean Return -155.75 -81.79 -14.97 -21.55 
 (-10.94) (-10.15) (-2.86) (-4.05) 
     
CAPM Alpha -150.55 -78.35 -13.30 -19.46 
 (-10.44) (-10.00) (-2.79) (-4.06) 
     
FF Alpha -134.56 -56.75 -4.36 -8.30 
 (-8.74) (-7.49) (-0.97) (-1.86) 
     
Average n 352    
 
Panel B: Non-January 
     
 Week 1 Weeks 1-4 Weeks 5-52 Weeks 1-52 
     
Mean Return -1.31 -43.45 8.97 4.74 
 (-29.30) (-17.21) (9.52) (4.94) 
     
CAPM Alpha -1.29 -42.31 9.10 4.95 
 (-29.60) (-17.91) (9.80) (5.32) 
     
FF Alpha -1.30 -43.55 9.20 5.04 
 (-29.75) (-17.08) (9.77) (5.25) 
     
Average n 355    
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By offering evidence against the overreaction story, I indirectly implicate market 
microstructure as a driving force behind short-run reversals. 
 Importantly, the continuation of weekly returns unifies the short-run 
predictability literature with other bodies of research that previously appeared disjoint.  
Consider first studies that document drift following specific news events.  Earnings 
surprises, stock splits, seasoned equity offerings, dividend initiations and omissions, 
repurchases, and merger announcements are all associated with some degree of return 
persistence for up to one year following the event.31  These studies find results of a 
completely different tenor than those in the short-run predictability literature, which has 
fixated on reversals.  I have shown here that, in concert with findings in the event 
literature, extreme weekly returns in fact persist.  In other words, there is no 
inconsistency between the two literatures.  Furthermore, the return persistence in both 
cases seems related to news. 
Second, the momentum literature documents continuation of intermediate-term 
returns.  To provide continuity with the short-run reversal literature, momentum 
researchers implicitly argue that a stock must have extreme returns for a longer period of 
time (say, three to six months) in order for the returns to persist.  This, however, is not 
the case according to the evidence presented here.  Momentum is not simply an 
intermediate-term phenomenon.  The same effect occurs even with very short formation 
periods. 
                                                 
31 The measurement and robustness of this drift, however, is still contested. 
 64
Granted, trading profits documented in the momentum literature are larger than 
the profits of my strategies.  However, this is not a function of the length of the 
formation period.  It is a function of the size of the formation period return.  Consider the 
following.  A six-month winner minus loser portfolio generates profits of about 12% 
(annualized) over the following year after skipping the first month.  Unreported tests 
reveal an average return to the spread portfolio of roughly 100% during the formation 
period.  The drift is therefore about twelve percent of the initial extreme return.  The 
weekly total return strategy has an average formation period return of 20%, which is 
followed by an annualized profit of about 3.5% in weeks five through fifty-two.  In this 
case, the drift is over seventeen percent of the initial extreme return.32  Along these lines, 
the strength of weekly return continuation is in the same ballpark as traditional 
momentum.  Thus, the persistence of weekly returns and momentum are remarkably 
similar and appear to be a manifestation of the same phenomenon. 
                                                 
32 Even if the first four weeks are considered, annualized average profit is about seven percent of the 
formation period return. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 Since the early 1990s, reversal has been the stylized fact associated with weekly 
individual stock returns.  Much attention has been devoted to identifying the source of 
this reversal pattern.  Some argue market microstructure effects such as bid-ask bounce, 
nonsynchronous trading, temporary price pressure, or specialists’ inventory concerns are 
to blame but have been unsuccessful in establishing a complete empirical link.  
Controlling for these issues, others have argued reversals are driven by the market 
overreacting to information.  In this dissertation, I provide an alternate vantage point for 
the debate and show extreme weekly returns actually persist over the following year.  In 
other words, weekly winners continue to outperform losers for a full year in spite of the 
brief reversal.  This suggests some of the attention on explaining reversals has been 
misplaced 
 The immediate implication is that short-run correctional reversals do not exist.  
If categorized as misreactions to information, extreme weekly returns are underreactions 
– not overreactions.  This serves as indirect evidence that brief reversals are market 
microstructure driven.  The predictability is also greater when news is more credibly 
identified.  For example, return persistence is stronger when accompanied by the specific 
news found in earnings announcements.  More generally, after controlling for total 
return, my measure of firm-specific news is positively related to future return as early as 
the next week.  These findings contribute to a growing body of work to show return 
continuation following news is ever-present at various horizons and seems to be a 
pervasive feature of the price formation process. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
This appendix follows Appendix I from Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 
(1998), which lists news events associated with event-date and long-run abnormal 
performance of the same sign.  I provide references of studies (if they exist) that 
document whether or not brief reversals also follow the events. 
 
A.  Evidence of No Immediate Reversal 
• Stock splits:  Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman (1984) 
• Tender offers and open market repurchases:  Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and 
Vermaelen (1995) 
• Analyst recommendations:  Womack (1996) 
• Dividend initiations and omissions:  Healy and Palepu (1988) 
• Earnings Surprises:  Bernard and Thomas (1989) 
 
B.  Indeterminate 
• Seasoned equity offerings:  Asquith and Mullins (1986) find significant 2-day 
average abnormal returns of -2.7% around the announcement of equity offerings.  
They report in their Table 2 average abnormal returns of .5% in the first four 
days after the announcement, but provide no information on the statistical 
significance for this return window. 
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• Public announcement of previous insider trades:  Seyhun (1998) finds abnormal 
stock returns for a full year following insider trades.  His analysis, which is based 
on monthly returns, does not report market reactions on the days surrounding the 
revelation of insider trades. 
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Table A-I 
Quick Reference for Main Methodology 
 
This is a step-by-step instruction for creating the dataset and forming and evaluating the 
trading strategy from Table I. 
 
 
Step 1:  Calculate weekly returns.  For all stocks listed in the daily CRSP files from 
1963 to 2001, calculate weekly returns as the return from Wednesday’s close to the 
following Wednesday’s close. 
 
Step 2:  Create the main sample.  From the weekly return dataset, retain the returns of 
all primary shares traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ exchanges whose prices 
exceed five dollars at the end of the previous week. 
 
Step 3:  Identify extreme returns.  Each week, rank stocks into deciles based on their 
prior week’s return.  Define the top return decile as the winners and the bottom return 
decile as the losers.  This week (week t) is referred to as the formation week. 
 
Step 4:  Form trading strategy.  Each week, create an equal-weighted portfolio of the 
prior week’s winners and an equal-weighted portfolio of the prior week’s losers.  The 
total return strategy is a zero investment strategy taking a long position in the winner 
portfolio and a short position in the loser portfolio.  For the total return strategy, the 
winner and loser portfolios each contain an average of 355 stocks across time. 
 
Step 5:  Evaluate trading strategy.  Use overlapping calendar-time portfolios to evaluate 
the strategy in weeks t+k1 through t+k2.  In a given calendar week τ, there are k2-k1+1 
open strategies formed in weeks τ-k2, τ-k2+1, … , τ-k1-1, τ-k1, respectively.   The profit 
in week τ is the mean profit across these cohort portfolios.  This procedure generates a 
single time series of profits representing the t+k1 through t+k2 window.  Average raw 
profit is the mean of the time series.  Average risk-adjusted profit is the alpha from a 
time series regression of strategy profits on risk factors (e.g., market returns or the Fama 
and French (1993) factors). 
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